Nicomachean Ethics

This was written for Ethics class of course.. Book reviews...
Aristotle’s never-ending quest for the truth leads him searching for the highest good, the good at the top of the hierarchy of goods. In this search, he considers happiness as that good.

First, Aristotle surveys several common conceptions of happiness. He decides that "there are roughly three most favoured lives--the lives of gratification, of political activity, and, third, of study (1095b18). He first considers the life of gratification. He compares this life to "a life for grazing animals," because basically the function of animals is merely to satisfy their appetites. The main argument that seems to defend this life is that "many in positions of power f eel the same way..." (1095b21). This concept is the life of the hedonist. The idea is that the road to a happy life is to satisfy immediate appetites and not be concerned with future consequences. Aristotle comes back to this idea later, but for now it seems that this opinion may be plausible.

Aristotle then addresses the life of political activity. He first disagrees with the idea that happiness is honor, since honor "seems to depend more on those who honour than on the one honoured," and intuition tells us that happiness is hard to take from us (1095b25). Also, the common conception of happiness being virtue is refuted by Aristotle because a virtuous person isn’t necessarily happy (1095b31), because "someone could possess virtue but suffer the worst evils and misfortunes...(and) no one would count him happy..." (1096a1). As we will see later, Aristotle believes it takes more than merely possessing virtue to be happy.

Aristotle then goes on developing his own ideology in i7 in an attempt to define the highest good, happiness. He considers the fact that the highest good of a particular set of endeavors (not the very highest good, per se), "is that for the sake of which the other things are done" and illustrates with the example that "in medicine this is health, in generalship victory, (and) in housebuilding a house..."(1097a18). Therefore, Aristotle believes that the highest good, happiness, is the one at which all other tasks aim. (1094a22). This idea could be summed up in terms of proximate and ultimate answers. Let’s take the example of housebuliding. Housebuilding is a proximate reason for building a house. This answer is next up in the hierarchy of goods. The ultimate reason for housebuliding, and the ultimate reason that any living object does anything, is because of happiness (evdaimonia, which could also be translated as "flourishing," which makes more sense in terms of plants).

It thus follows that "happiness is more than anything else...complete, since we always choose it because of itself, never because of something else" (1097b1). We never say that we want to be happy for some other reason than the fact that happiness is what we strive for. It would be absurd to ask someone why they want to be happy. Also, Aristotle states that happiness seems to be self-sufficient because "all by itself it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing" (1097b14) . Basically, if you are truly happy, then there is nothing more you can ask. The reason is because there is nothing higher than happiness.

Aristotle then sets out to find what happiness is in human terms by looking at the function of the human soul (1097b24). He first states that living is shared with plants, and that the function of plants is "the life of nutrition and growth,& quot; which could be set aside as the human function because "we are looking for...the special function of a human being" (1098a). He also decides that "the life next in order is some sort of life of sense-perception; but this too is appar ently shared (with the animals)" (1098a2). He decides that the remaining possibility is the life of reasoning (1098a3). Aristotle clarifies what he means by "reasoning" through stating that he means it both in terms of obeying reason and thinking.

Aristotle then states that "the human good (is) the soul’s activity that expresses virtue" (1098a16). This indicates two points: (1) The human good (happiness) is an activity, and (2) the activity expresses some virtue. Virtue, in the case of humans then becomes reasoning well (just like the virtue of a good harpist is his ability to play the harp well (1098a9)). Therefore, we could conclude that the human virtue is reasoning well. Remember, earlier we stated that happiness is not merely possessing virtue. Therefore, we could conclude that merely possessing the ability to reason well will not make us happy, we must express this virtue by actually making good decisions.

The idea that the human virtue is reasoning well may seem a bit obscure; however, it falls in line as the natural conclusion to what was stated earlier. Previously, Aristotle said that happiness is that for the sake of which all actions are done. Keep in mind that we must reason well in order to choose the actions that make us happy. Therefore, reasoning well is a tool that can lead us to happiness, and if we reason poorly we will not achieve happiness. For example, if we reason poorly, we may think that we are doing what will lead us to happiness; however, in truth it will not ultimately make us happy. At this point in the work, Aristotle still does not tell us what it means to reason well. Therefore, we could still subscribe t o most of the beliefs about what it means to reason well, and thus what it means for a human being to be happy.

Aristotle goes on to defend the conclusion that happiness is an activity by showing that common beliefs about happiness adhere to it. The first common belief he mentions is that goods are classified into three types: goods of the soul, external goods, and goods of the body (1098b13). Aristotle states, "goods of the soul are said to be goods to the fullest extent..." (1098b15). At 1098b18, Aristotle states that for actions and activities that are the end (i.e. doing a particular action for the sake of itself, because it makes us happy), the end is a good of the soul, not an external good (a product in the external world). The good in this case is created for the soul, not other people. An example of this might be playing the piano just for fun. It makes me happy, and when I’m playing alone, there is nobody else listening (so it is not external). Also, though practicing makes me better at playing, that is not the reason why I am practicing. Thus, practicing is the end, and it is a good of the soul.

"The belief that the happy person lives well and does well in action also agrees with (Aristotle’s) account, since (he has) said that the end is a sort of living well and doing well in action" (1098b21). He also states that his account agrees with those who say happiness is virtue in general or some particular virtue, because expressing virtue requires virtue (1098b30). He mentions, however, that "it matters quite a bit whether we suppose that the best good consists in possessing or in using (virtue)" (1099a). He states that just as Olympic prizes are only for those who express their virtue of strength by competing, only "the fine and good people who act correctly win the prize (of happiness)" (1099a5). Therefore, we must use virtue to act correctly and win the prize, and merely possessing it is not enough. Basically, he is saying that you must both live well and do well in action, as well as possess virtue to be happy; however, you still need more. So in a way, these other accounts of happiness agree with his.

Next, Aristotle makes a distinction between those things that are just pleasant and those things that are pleasant by nature (1099a6-20). Aristotle summarizes, "The things that please most people conflict, because they are not pleasant by nature, whereas the things that please lovers of what is fine are things pleasant by nature; and actions expressing virtues are pleasant in this way; and so they both please lovers of what is fine (good according to truth) and are pleasant in themselves" ; (1099a12-15). The distinction between endeavors that are pleasant (or apparently pleasant) and pleasant by nature lies in whether or not the endeavor contributes to the highest good. If it contributes to the highest good, it is pleasant by nature. If something contributes to the highest good, it automatically becomes pleasant. It thus follows that, "(One’s) life does not need (apparent) pleasure to be added [to virtuous activity] as some sort of ornament; rather, it has its pleasure within itself." An example might help to illustrate this point. If someone is sick, there may be two options they could take to make them feel better; eating ice cream and taking medicine. While eating ice cream may be pleasant at the moment of ingestion, i t will not make you feel better. Medicine on the other hand may not taste as good, but it will make your illness go away (hopefully). The ice cream is the apparent pleasure, and medicine is pleasant by nature. It follows that medicine becomes also appa rently pleasant. Therefore, those who believe that happiness is pleasure are satisfied because Aristotle’s account of happiness includes things that are pleasant, but only things that are pleasant by nature.

This is where Aristotle starts to show us his own set beliefs of how we should reason. At this point, Aristotle is speaking against the life of the hedonist. A hedonist would believe that anything pleasant is good. Aristotle, however, states that not all pleasant things are pleasant by nature. These opinions once again adhere to the idea that happiness is making good decisions through reasoning because if we reason (correctly) that we should take the medicine instead of eat the ice cream, we will be happy (or at least continue on the path of a happy way of life).

Aristotle then addresses the apparent need of external goods in order to be happy. He states that "happiness evidently also needs external goods to be added...since we cannot, or cannot easily, do fine actions if we lack the resources" ( 1099a32). Though one needs certain resources to do certain activities (ex. you need a ball to play basketball), you don’t need external goods to be happy. Earlier, Aristotle stated that if we can express virtue, we can be happy (1098a13-20). This may sound a bit bizarre, but it should be noted that there is more than one way to achieve happiness. Also, if we don’t know how to act, we can’t possibly help ourselves, and therefore can’t be happy.

This point about external goods is very important, and it should be noted that reasoning well alone (and making good decisions) will not make you happy. If someone is born a slave and finds himself chained to a wall for eternity, I wouldn’t call him happy. If you have no food, reasoning will not keep you from starving. You do need some external goods to be happy. However, the question lies in what those are. Some people consider themselves happy with very little, while others feel that they need many external goods to be happy.

Another point that should be made is that there is an inherent randomness on this planet that can make bad things happen to good people. To the extreme, one might be able to argue that you can use reason to avoid danger, but the only sensible (and thus reasonable) way to do this would be to hide in a plastic bubble. I do not think that expressing reason alone will make a person happy. However, all other things being equal, and the fact that you can control your own fate to a great extent leads u s to believe that you must reason well to make the right decisions in order to be happy. If you don’t do a good job of controlling the part of your fate that you can control, there is no hope for you.

I don’t believe that Aristotle’s views are very concrete as to what it means to reason well, as Aristotle himself states, "This, then, is a sketch of the good... If the sketch is good, then anyone, it seems, can advance and articulate it...&qu ot; (1098a22). There are a few underlying principles, like the distinction between what is apparently pleasant and what is pleasant by nature, but nobody can actually say what it means for an individual to reason well. The line between apparent good and actual good is not very distinct. You must decide for yourself when the pleasure you experience is ultimate enough (and not just something proximate that will make you feel pleasure at first, but not in the long run). Aristotle only addresses this facet (for now anyway) in terms of the obvious. He does however point out to us that this line exists.

Immanuel Kant's Ethics

How can you decide whether your actions are moral or not?

In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant puts forth a line of reasoning that can be used to test whether or not an action is moral or not. In this paper, I will attempt to find the argument behind it and review some situations which will test its validity. I will then give my own interpretation of Kant’s theory and explain where I stand on the issue.

The first section of Grounding discusses common conceptions of what it means to act in a morally just way. Kant sums up by stating that "a good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself" (394). This has two parts that can be best illustrated by an example. The first part is that a good will is not considered good because of what it accomplishes. Let’s say for example that someone has fallen into a river and cannot swim. If someone were to jump in the water and save this person because they felt it was the right thing to do, we would certainly consider this a moral act (if not heroic). The reason is simply because the person’s willing was the only thing that led them to do the act. Therefore, this person would have acted from duty because the action was done without regard to any further end (397). Someone acting from duty is considered to have a good will.

Let’s now say that the person who fell in is the son of a wealthy businessman who would surely give a large reward to the heroic soul who saved his son. If a person deliberating on whether or not so jump in the water and save the son decides to do so solely because that there will be a reward, they would not have done a purely moral act. This is because the reason they acted was not good will, but the desire for a reward. Therefore, this person would have acted merely in accord with duty, because though attempting to save the boy was the right thing to do, the reason it was done was because of the desire for a reward (397).

The second part of Kant’s statement is that a good will doesn’t depend on whether or not it attains some desired end. Thus, in the above case, if the first person failed to save the boy, it would not have made his acting any less heroic or morally just (and therefore his will any less good) than if he had saved the boy. However, it should be noted that since the second person’s goal was reward money, he would fail by not saving the boy because he would probably not get a reward.

The above actions, and all actions for that matter, can be explained as being done under one of two conditions. The conditions are called "imperatives" and are expressed by an ought (i.e. "you ought to...") (413). Kant states that "all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically" (414). Hypothetical imperatives represent the "practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants" (PAGE? ). This could be rephrased as "You ought to do X if you want Y." The second person explained above acted on a hypothetical imperative. The reason they attempted to save the boy was because they wanted the reward money (the end), and they knew that they could get it by saving the boy (the means). Even though this person acted in accord with duty (they did the right thing), they did not act from duty (the reward, not duty, was why they saved the boy).

"The categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end" (PAGE). This could be rephrased as "You ought to do X." Notice that Kant states that first, there is only one categorical imperative; and second, it is objective and therefore pertains to everyone. Hypothetical imperatives are subjective because they only apply to those who want to attain Y. The first person noted above acted on the categorical imperative. They saved the boy only because they felt it was the right thing to do, or in other words, something "they ought to" do. This involves the categorical imperative because there was no real benefit to this person in saving the boy, and we assume that this person was neither aware of, nor hoping for any reward (though we can never be absolutely sure). Therefore, we could rule out the possibility that they were acting on a hypothetical imperative (unlike the second person, whose end was a reward).

The obvious question is now, "What is the categorical imperative?" Kant states it at 421 as follows: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it (your maxim) should become a universal law." Therefore, in order to act according to this moral law, you must act only for reasons that everyone can share for doing your actions. In order to check and see whether or not an action is done in accordance with moral law (and is therefore a moral action), it should be tested against this imperative for a contradiction. Kant gives examples in different realms of duty.

Kant believes if someone were not to act in accord with the categorical imperative, there would be a contradiction, and this contradiction would show that if everyone acted according to the maxim of the act, it would not be possible to achieve your ends. This contradiction is not easy to find in all cases, but according to Kant, if your action is not moral, the contradiction is there.

With that in mind, we should be able to find a contradiction in the second life-saving example from above. Alas, the contradiction in this example is one of the hardest to find, and Kant himself does a poor job of explaining why we should sometimes help others from duty (423). His reasoning of why we should sometimes help people seems to hinge on the law of nature for self-preservation. Kant states that that "even though it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in accord ance with [a maxim in which nobody helped anyone, nor took the help of others], it is impossible to will that it should hold everywhere as a law of nature...[because] cases might often arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself... of all hope of the aid he wants for himself" (423). Basically, it seems that Kant is stating that because of the law of nature for self-preservation (which may sometimes require the assistance of others), the re is a contradiction. However, without this additional law the categorical imperative doesn’t really cause a contradiction because a world where nobody helps anyone is conceivable.

The categorical imperative only tells us whether or not an action is moral or non-moral. It does not tell us whether or not an action is immoral. For example, if there was a third person who had no desire to save the boy and whose maxim was to ne ver help anyone, they would not be acting in accordance with the categorical imperative and therefore would not be acting morally. Also, the person saving the boy because of the reward is also not acting in accordance with the categorical imperative and therefore not acting morally. The categorical imperative has no real distinction between these two people (even though we might still consider the person who acted in accord with duty a hero). Even worse, the categorical imperative does not distinguish between a murderer from someone who saves a person for the reward money.

Another problem with the helping others example is that the categorical imperative makes no distinction as to what amount of helping others is the morally just amount. It is known that we should help others sometimes, but how much? What if we per sonally never require the assistance of others? Shouldn’t it follow that we are not obligated to help other people? At what point has someone done their fair share of helping others?

I feel that Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative makes a valiant attempt at striving to define the moral laws that we as rational creatures already know exist deep down inside. The fact that most people would agree that morality is something everyone must follow attests to Kant’s theory that the categorical imperative is a universal law in that it applies to everyone. This is why it also makes sense that the categorical imperative takes into account making your decisions based on whether or not your maxim could become a universal law.

However, especially in cases such as helping others, the categorical imperative doesn’t seem to serve as a very good guideline. It does not show that someone who never required the help of others could not get away with never helping anyone in ne ed in a world where nobody helped anybody. Also, it doesn’t help us decide what it means to be immoral.

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